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Abstract
‘Municipal indigents’ are a category of poor citizens who qualify to receive certain municipal services for 
free in South Africa. Having registered as municipal indigents, the poor not only gain access to free basic 
services but also embark upon a voyage into a bureaucratic underworld where policies are changed and 
eligibility criteria and sanctions are unevenly applied. Various preconditions and limits on services, as well 
as social surveillance of indigent households, has turned indigency programmes into a ‘regime’. The policy 
has swung from hard cost recovery (mass disconnections) during the period 1994–2000 to ‘free’ basic 
services and, more recently, to social-shaming and criminalisation. This paper provides a thematic account 
of recent municipal indigent processes in order to explore the ‘moving boundary’ between benevolence and 
control regarding this crucial citizen–state interface. Based on recent interviews with government officials, a 
review of relevant government documents, and describing the administrative complexities, the paper reveals 
aspects of what the poor confront in day-to-day experiences of the state. It is argued that there are lessons 
for all municipalities seeking a more sustainable and democratic path to citizenship rather than an ongoing 
low-level war with poor citizens.
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Introduction
In March 2012, Ratanda – a black township in the Lesedi Municipality, south east of Johannesburg 
– experienced an exceptionally violent uprising lasting three days. Eight councillors’ houses and 
municipal buildings, including the library, were attacked. The protestors were assuaged only after 
the Minister of Police and the Minister of Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs arrived 
to address the huge crowd in the local stadium (Independent Online, 23 March 2012).
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The protestors grievances included: arbitrary electricity cuts, inaccurate billing to households, 
a 16% electricity price increase, legitimate indigents disconnected and long delays in approving 
indigent applications. In 2012, there were only 1500 registered indigents – too few for a sizeable 
poor township. According to the municipality, ‘there were genuine issues’ (in the community). 
The indigent register and database had not been updated in 2011 (Interview with a Senior Official, 
Lesedi Municipality, 5 August 2015).
The municipality argued that although they were ‘in the wrong in 2012, matters had improved’ 
(Interview with Senior Official Lesedi Municipality, 5 August 2015). Following the 2012 upris-
ings, councillors in this municipality no longer approve indigent applications, because this has 
added to delays (Interview with Senior Official Lesedi Municipality, 5 August 2015). Rather, the 
Finance department was put in charge of indigents. ‘We now just use ID numbers; we have mass 
registration drives and indigent road shows’ (Interview with Senior Official Lesedi Municipality, 
5 August 2015).
Protestors, it seemed, had won a small victory. By June 2015, the Mayor of Lesedi municipality 
proudly announced that, ‘our registered indigents have surpassed the 4000 mark. We also expect 
this number to increase as part of our objective to ensuring that all our indigents in within our 
municipality do receive free basic services’ (Lesedi Local Municipality, 18 June 2015). At the time, 
the municipality saw major ‘challenges’ in implementing the indigent policy of the municipality, 
ranging from ‘lack of awareness to compliance’. However, in 2015, electricity ‘theft’ was still a big 
problem. In Lesedi the problem of illegal electricity connections was regarded by local govern-
ment as being severe. The municipality claims it is able to monitor household electricity purchases 
and when households do not buy electricity for several weeks or more the municipality sees this as 
an indicator of an illegal connection (about 1200 of 30,000 households were ‘stealing’ electricity). 
The municipality is able to identify areas where electricity re-appropriation is occurring following 
which, as a first step, they remove the meter box and then, as a second measure, they remove cables 
(Interview with Finance Manager, 22 July 2015). Several other municipal officials (Interviews, 
August 2015) complained that residents in townships in particular are trapped in a ‘culture’ of non-
payment – a residue of the rent boycott protests in the 1980s.
The Ratanda case, however, illustrates many key debates, movements and ambivalences in both 
the national indigent policy framework and the local implementation process. Using interviews 
with municipal officials,1 this paper is based on the author’s interest in how poor residents of black 
townships in South Africa experience municipal bureaucracies and municipal services. An attempt 
is made to present an understanding of the reciprocal dynamics at the citizen–state interface. It is 
shown that ‘indigency’ – a discrete category applied by municipalities – is how the South African 
local state, in what might be regarded as the most unequal country in the world, ‘deals’ with the 
very large numbers of poor, almost all of whom are black. The focus of the paper is on the follow-
ing themes in municipal indigent policies:
(1) The oscillations in the application processes and agency or department responsible for managing 
indigent lists and ways of verifying indigency;
(2) Changing targeting mechanisms (indigent lists, income, property valuation, universal);
(3) The quantum of services and range of benefits;
(4) The indigency exit programme; and
(5) Citizen morality and punitive measures for false information and non-payment.
I then consider general political issues in indigency regimes: I do not examine popular responses 
in any detail but focus on the local state machinery and indigent policies.
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If we regard policy (such as the indigence policy) as a ‘field of power’ in which governments or 
parties assert hegemony (Clarke, 2004), then it becomes important to grasp the details of such 
policy, its techniques, mixtures of coercion and consent and their changes. Hegemony includes the 
power to name a problem, to set an agenda and rules for policy and the exercise of material power. 
This ‘field of power’ is one in which government hegemony has to be constantly reinforced. Much 
of the existing critical work on local policy tends to expose the policy–implementation gap 
(Tissington, 2008), or dismiss indigent policies and state welfare as tokenistic (Bond, 2014), or 
reduce it to a single state logic (Naidoo, 2006, 2010). I argue that in contemporary South Africa the 
contradictory impulses and oscillations in South African social policy (helping and containing the 
poor) mean that it is necessary to go beyond simply dismissing policy as anti-poor or inconse-
quential; see also Titmuss (Abel-Smith, 2008), who insisted on detailed studies of bureaucratic 
processes. Oscillations and fine tuning of policy are partly a response to the growing list of indi-
gents and adaptive struggles of the poor for survival. It is important to study the moving bounda-
ries between benevolence and control, between coercion and consent, in the administration of 
‘indigents’, because millions of black, poor people are affected.
From coercion to paternalism: free services and indigent policies 
for the period 1994–2006
The term ‘indigent’ has gained currency in South Africa when, after 2001, municipalities started 
to introduce free basic services. At least three and a half million mainly black poor households 
(25% of the total population) in South Africa qualified as indigent in 2014, according to the state 
(RSA, 2015). Together with government schemes to assist the ‘most vulnerable’ – social grants, 
free Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) housing, no fee schools and other sup-
port programmes – indigent social packages (free basic water and debt write-offs) have become the 
ANC’s ‘social wage’ for poor people. Child support grants grew from a mere 150,000 beneficiaries 
in 2000 to ten million recipients in 2011 (RSA, 2014). Grants do make a significant difference, 
although means tested support continues to stigmatise recipients (Wright et al, 2014). However, it 
has also been argued that the state welfare system is a form of encadrement/patronage used by 
the ANC to ensure that it maintains the electoral loyalty of the black poor (Berman, 2016).
It is important to note that from 1994 to 2001 South Africa had no free municipal services for 
the poor and a coercive approach was used (what some might call ‘roll-back’ neoliberalism). All 
services had to be paid for by all households (rich and poor ). Non-payment could result in total 
cut-offs of services; and tariffs were set to allow municipalities to recover the full operating costs 
of supplying water (McDonald 2002). As Atkinson argued,
In the past, most municipalities have used a coercive approach to securing payment. This involves cutting 
off water or electricity supplies … However; there are many implementation problems with regard to 
coercive approaches: Cutting off water often does not always lead to payment of arrears. Defaulters may 
simply steal water, or install illegal connections. Many Councillors are reluctant to take strong political 
measures. (Atkinson, 2002: 39)
In addition to the coercive aspects mentioned by Atkinson (2002), a cholera epidemic in KwaZulu-
Natal in 2000–2001 resulted in 265 deaths (Hemson et al, 2006). The problem, as the government 
explained,
…is that when we try to implement cost recovery, many of the poor cannot pay. The consequence, when 
they are then excluded from the taps, has been seen with the cholera outbreak in KwaZulu-Natal. (Kasrils, 
2000)
172 Journal of Asian and African Studies 53(2)
In 2000, under Kasrils’ leadership, a rethink led to a nation-wide free basic water policy for the 
poor, to be funded by national government through equitable share allocations. As Kasrils recalled, 
‘If I have to reflect back then one of the key milestones was the development and implementation 
of the Free Basic Water policy in 2000’ (DWA, 2004: 5). As Mike Muller, the director general who 
had defended full cost recovery, admitted,
We have had to confront the fact that in a very unequal society like South Africa, a policy of cost recovery, 
which makes perfect sense in a more equitable society, would exclude the poor from access to that basic 
commodity, to which they have a right. (New York Times, Water Tap often shut for the poor, 29 May 2003)
This was thus a major shift in the policy of universal full cost recovery, and social movements saw 
it as a victory for the poor (Cosatu, 2006; Bond 2008). The government defined ‘basic water’ as
the infrastructure necessary to supply 25 litres of portable water per person per day supplied within 
200 metres of a household and with a minimum flow of 10 litres per minute (in the case of communal 
water points) or 6000 litres of portable water supplied per formal connection per month (in the case of 
yard or house connections). (RSA, 2006: 20)
The main advisors to the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) stressed that free basic 
water (FBW) was integral to cost recovery and not a policy reversal:
The availability of options, which restrict the flow to consumers, is an important attribute of a good local 
free basic water policy. It allows people who cannot afford to pay more, to get only a basic supply (poverty 
relief level). Under a free basic water policy, it is essential that all unrestricted supplies are metered. 
(Palmer Development Group, 2001: 14)
Among water experts and bureaucrats, FBW policy was both a humanitarian act and a manage-
rial device. As Muller argued, it is ‘an innovative approach that will enable us to separate the 
can’t pays from the won’t pays’ (Muller 2001a: 14). It is not difficult to extricate the moral 
coding in this essentially new public management discourse (Clarke and Newman, 1997). This 
reinforces the idea, well-known in policy literature, that policies have hidden agendas and 
implicit value systems (Weiss 1998: 53; Walker 1993). Muller (2001a: 38), a senior state offi-
cial, argued that ‘the key issue is that the programme is designed and implemented as part of 
a larger process of building local government’ and identifying ‘free riders’. Naidoo (2006: 8) 
has suggested that the ‘real aim’ of indigent services is to trap the poor into ‘binding agree-
ments to pay for their services’. However, there seem to be a number of logics behind free 
basic services and the indigency system – such as dividing the very poor and the poor and the 
working class.
While the free basic water policy was heresy in some water circles, its implementation is already helping 
to promote accountability and good financial management in local government. The distinction between 
the ‘can’t pays’ and the ‘won’t pays’ is clarified and ‘free-riders’ with higher than basic levels of service 
more easily identified. (Muller, 2001b)
The Department of Finance, led by Trevor Manuel who presided over an increasingly unequal 
South Africa, suggested that, ‘to make it (FBW) work, only the really proven poor should get 
these while anyone else should be forced to pay even at higher tariffs’ (Department of Finance, 
2001: 132). In some ways, the less poor would find themselves under more pressure to pay more 
and pay regularly. The poor, on the other hand, while not paying for services at all would have to 
be restricted to a ‘basic lifestyle’.
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Setting standards for indigent services
In an attempt to provide some standards, central government developed an Indigent Policy 
Framework in 2005 (RSA, 2006). The government was at pains to stress that free services ‘must 
be accessible for all poor residents, implying that those in unregulated settlements (and those 
living in back yards) must be brought into the municipal system so that residents are not excluded 
from indigent support’ (RSA, 2006: 8). Most municipalities, however, only provided free services 
to municipal account holders, thereby excluding backyarders.
National guidelines also prescribe a basic package: ‘it is recognised that resource constraints prevent many 
municipalities from delivering a fuller range of services free to the indigent. Therefore, the definition of 
the essential services package, to be provided to all, is kept relatively narrow’. (RSA, 2005)
Fixing the basic water supply at 6000 litres per month (and delivering this amount through the 
communal tap) is often not realistic given the needs of large poor households and the densely 
populated townships where water requirements are around 15,000 litres per month – significantly 
higher than 6000 per month. As Table 1 shows, levels of services and amounts vary between 
municipalities. Some offer 6000 litres, others up to 10,000 litres.
Variations in targeting methods
The government guideline document indicates the different methods for targeting the poor, and 
the advantages and disadvantages of each method (RSA, 2005: 23–24). By 2014, almost 70% of 







Benefits of registration Periodic review 
of beneficiaries
Cape Town Finance Household 
Income and 
property
• No property rates
•  Free 50 kW of electricity 
and R30 subsidy
•  Free 6000 litres of water 
per month
12 months
Ekurhuleni Finance Household 
income and 
property
•  9000 litres of free water 
per month
• 100 kWh free electricity
• No property rates







• No property rates
•  8000 litres of free water 
per month
• 75 kWh of fee electricity
12 months
eThekwini No indigent 
registration, uses 
of valuation roll
Property Value • No property rates
• Free 65 kWh of electricity





Income/capital •  Free services according 
to poverty index
6 months




• No property rates
• Free 100 kWh electricity
•  Free 12,000 litres of 
water per month
24 months
Source: adapted from Pillay (2010).
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Figure 1. Procedures and processes for implementation.
Source: Midvaal Municipality (2014).
municipalities used household income thresholds and fixed these at R2701 a month (RSA, 2015). 
Cape Town offers the FBS to all households and so it does not have to verify indigent incomes. 
It offers extra benefits to those who register and insists that indebted households must use flow 
limiters so that they can be held to the monthly free quota. Table 1 shows how different munici-
palities have implemented the national policy.
In larger municipalities (eight metros) most beneficiaries will be automatic indigents (i.e., they 
do not need to apply to be registered as indigent); but in the large majority of medium to small 
municipalities the poor have to apply in person at local offices. Given the detailed information 
required for eligibility (age, income, size of household, etc.), surveillance and micro-controls thus 
become a source of conflict between citizens and the state.
The application process and ‘continuous’ surveillance of the poor
The application process (which department to apply to, the role of ward councillors in vetting appli-
cations, waiting time and re-verification) differs for each municipality. Many municipalities have 
repeatedly changed their criteria, procedures and rules for indigency. Figure 1 and Table 1 show that 
in Ekurhuleni and Midvaal both the finance and social development departments are involved.
The process is typically quite elaborate and labour-intensive: once the application is received, 
the state carries out a house visit, to assess eligibility (often the entire household’s income must 
be declared), and if there are indicators of material wealth such as a television or Internet access, 
then the application might be declined. In the financially stressed Metsi Maholo Municipality, a 
senior municipal official noted, ‘We employ fieldworkers to do checks’ (Interview, 17 June 2015). 
Lesedi’s new policy (2015, clause 11.1.17) states that
…the assessments of indigent’s applicant’s include a lifestyle audit and ownership of luxurious items 
e.g. Motor car, DSTV decoders etc [sic]. Where tampering is discovered, all benefits will immediately be 
suspended. A fine according to the Credit Control and Tariff Policy will be imposed. The service will be 
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terminated and will only be re-installed on the payment of the full amount of the reconnection fee and fine 
(Lesedi Local Municipality, 2015)
As the newspaper Business Day (8 September 2011) noted,
Where SARS does not believe that a taxpayer has made full disclosure of income in a return, he or she 
could be subject to a lifestyle audit. Since the Congress of South African Trade Unions’ general secretary 
Zwelinzima Vavi coined the term two years ago, it has been associated with politicians, such as Julius 
Malema, whom the Hawks are investigating after allegations of tender fraud.(Business Day, 2011)
It is significant that the Lesedi Municipality extends the term lifestyle audit to the poor. The 
applicant has to update their status annually or, in some cases, every six months. In other words, 
monitoring (surveillance) by the state is ‘continuous’, as is stated explicitly in the Midvaal process 
(see centre-box in Figure 1, which shows the application cycle).
The Democratic Alliance (DA)-run Midvaal Municipality has a stringent process and stringent 
criteria for indigency, but admits the ‘whole process is beset with difficulties’ (Midvaal Municipality, 
2014: 666).2 Ekurhuleni Municipality (2014) noted that, ‘Indigent relief will NOT be granted 
where the applicant,
(a) Receives significant benefits or regular monetary income that is above the indigent qualification 
threshold;
(b) Is not registered as consumer of services in the records of Council;
(c) Rent/s or subleases his property or part thereof to any third party during the duration of the grant period; or
(d) Tampers or illegally connects or reconnects services prior to this application, until such time as the total 
costs, penalties, other fees, illegal consumption and any applicable tariffs and rates due to the Council have 
been paid in full.
In Ekurhuleni, to be registered according to its Indigent Support Policy,
…the applying citizen must present his/her Identity Document with copy of monthly account statement 
and/or prepaid meter token along with SAPS (Police services) certificate affidavit of names and identity 
number of individuals residing on property at the point of application. The onus is on the recipient of relief 
to inform the Council of any change in his/her status or personal household circumstances. …Criminal 
charges may be brought against such person/s. (Ekurhuleni, 2014: 10)
Kenny Tsotetsi, a community activist linked to recent protests in Ratanda, argued that, ‘the 
municipality audits people’s homes looking for brandy, dstv decoders, or furniture accounts to 
disqualify indigents’ (Interview, 27 July 2015). Lesedi’s Head of Community Services noted that 
a ‘teacher living with a pensioner will get free services. We scrutinised the indigent applications 
and found many irregularities. The culture of non-payment is a problem’ (Interview 24 July 2015).
Dlamini noted that,
…in Mogale City the registration of indigent applications are handled at the municipality’s headquarters 
in Krugersdorp. For the poorest of the poor, the central office in Krugersdorp may require transport, which 
is a cost. However, activists argue that the indigent management should be decentralised. There are 
community structures such as ward committees, community liaison officers and community development 
workers which can be harnessed to handle registrations. (Dlamini, 2011: 72–73)
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A final example: in Mbombela, the ward councillor has to ‘recommend’ the applicant and, impor-
tantly, the final list is made public (Mbombela, ND) thus allowing for public shaming of alleged 
fraudsters and neighbours, designed to expose undeserving indigents.
According to Seri’s review of indigent policies,
…of the indigent policies examined, 32 policies encouraged residents to examine the list of prospective 
indigents and verify that people on the list are indeed indigent. The idea is that the indigent register should 
be made public for comments by members of the public, who are entitled to make objections to the register 
in respect of any other person’s qualification as indigent. (Seri, 2013: 63)
A local community development worker in Lesedi noted that,
the indigent policy is not working … it takes a year to get registered as an indigent. If the owner of the 
house has no papers they have to go to the high court to prove ownership to apply for indigent status. 
(Interview, 27 July 2015)
Free services notwithstanding, elderly residents of Lesedi receive bills of R1300 a month 
(Interview, 27 July 2015). Clearly, the effective administration of indigency is a major burden 
for municipalities.
In summary, municipalities have made the application process as unpalatable and time- 
consuming as possible for residents. The state appropriates time. It is likely that many indigents 
will also be child support grantees who also queue for long periods to get benefits. Researchers 
investigating the child support grant (CSG) reported that, for example, ‘The process of applying 
for CSG was described by many as being detrimental to dignity, as was the opprobrium often 
associated with their status as CSG recipients’ (Wright et al., 2014).
The sheer fact of having to queue for long periods is presented as something that erodes dignity, as it 
conveys the impression to the CSG applicants that SASSA does not consider them or their time to be 
important and as such this is detrimental to women’s sense of worthiness. Queuing was also described as 
stigmatising. (Wright et al., 2014)
The number of registered, active indigents
Although there may be millions of poor households needing free services, many do not register 
and many are disqualified technically: for example, backyard shacks or illegal shacks (non-
account holders) are excluded. The government’s view is that the ‘most vulnerable societal 
groupings (women, child-headed households, and the unemployed)’ do not register for ‘fear of 
attracting adverse official attention and many are also not aware of these concessions’.
In Tshwane Municipality, for example, in 2008 the goal was to get 90,000 indigent households 
to register. The council had only registered about 50,000 indigent households (SA News 28 January 
2009). In fact, in most municipalities, the number of registered indigents is admitted to be grossly 
under-representative of those who actually qualify (Tissington, 2008).
The City of Johannesburg increased the number of indigent households with free basic elec-
tricity from a mere 12,600 in 2013 to 288,000 in 2014 (see Table 2). The indigency programme 
is a massive programme even if uneven and erratic as shown in Table 2. In 2014, the indigent 
numbers increased by 140,000, or 4.2%, from 2013, thanks to awareness drives by councils 
about their indigent policies (RSA, 2015). The non-financial census of municipalities, 2014 
noted that municipalities had registered more indigent households to benefit from free basic 
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Exit strategies: ‘graduating out’ of poverty
While stressing inclusion, the state wants households whose circumstances have improved to be 
taken off indigent registers. In the Draft Indigency Guidelines (RSA, 2005), the government had 
already noted that, ‘Municipalities need to start planning realistic exit strategies for their indigent 
populations to exit from the indigent registers and subsidies’ (RSA, 2005). Municipalities impose 
onerous pre-conditions, such as regular re-registration, on households, thus keeping large numbers 
of poor households off the list and ensuring their exit (see Table 1). Ekurhuleni Municipality, using 
Orwellian language, similar to the apartheid regime, insists that it wants ‘to ensure the implementa-
tion of an exit strategy to support the increased mobility of the poor from the indigent register’ 
(Ekurhuleni 2014).
In Tshwane, the indigent ‘exit strategy’ for Tshwane (see Pillay, 2010) ‘is a mechanism for 
tracking households deemed indigent in order to determine when they should be graduated off (sic) 
of the indigent register’. Tshwane like other municipalities ‘is concerned about the cost of free 
basic services increasing in future. All of this constitutes a strong rationale for having an effective 
indigent exit strategy’ (Pillay, 2010). However, so-called ‘exit strategies for identified indigents are 
not well planned or clearly outlined’ (Seri, 2013: 46). Exit speaks to the ANC fearing dependency 
among the poor. In 2004, in his State of the Nation speech, President Mbeki stressed that,
We should not cultivate a culture of dehumanizing dependency in these masses through increasing welfare. 
… The objective is that we should increase the number of people in society who depend for their livelihood, 
not on social grants, but on normal participation in the economy.
State morality after 2011: between the genuine, the corrupt and 
the feckless
Indigent lists/registers are a major political–moral interface with the officially defined poor (those 
with less than R2500 per month in household income). Poverty is only recognised by the state when 
certain rigid criteria are met. Second, once categorised and registered as indigent, a variety of other 
remedial programmes can be linked to this status (e.g. unemployed indigents can be put onto munic-
ipal employment databases and provided with jobs in the expanded public works programmes). 
Third, the poor are deemed to be of this status partly because they lack a ‘work-seeking’ culture and 
fail to prioritise spending (Clarke and Newman, 1997; Pithouse, 2008). In addition, the surveillance 
of the indigents can be increased under the guise reducing fraud, through social worker home visits. 
In some municipalities such as Cape Town, for example, an explicit link is made between the gen-
erosity of the ratepayer and the ability of the municipality to provide free services for the poor. The 
moving boundary between helping and controlling in South Africa has created new black subjects 
of local administration sometimes seen as deserving poor but also as abject. Abject racial subjects 
such as ‘indigents’ are positioned in official and policy discourses as potentially criminal and 
pathological. Worried about poor state finances, municipal bureaucrats have openly stigmatised 
the black poor as dependent ‘lazy communities’ having a ‘culture of non-payment’, with an implicit 
comparison to whites who are the norm of civic mindedness (Ruiters, 2007; Makhubu, 2013).
A recent trend however is for municipalities to ‘update their policies’ to enhance punitive 
measures against ‘fraudsters’. With huge unpaid municipal debts to Eskom, the national electricity 
provider, Minister Gordhan identified two key issues in indigent processes. First, municipal indi-
gent registers needed to be ‘cleaned up’ since,
…we find that indigent registers, sometimes, have the names of public sector officials, business people 
and professionals so that they now get exempt from paying for municipal services. That then deprives the 
municipality of very urgently needed revenue on their side. (Independent Online 11 June 2015)
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Second, Gordhan noted, ‘there is a non-payment culture among communities that can actually 
afford to pay’ (Independent Online, 11 June 2015).
This social–moral regime was dramatically intensified by President Zuma’s statements in 2015 
(Independent Online 25 March 2015), when he remarked that he ‘wished he were a dictator’ so that 
he could reverse his own government’s policy on providing grants and public services. ‘People 
don’t want to work because they are free’. (Independent Online, 25 March 2015) The ANC has 
stated in a somewhat more diplomatic manner that the South African state’s social policy needs to 
be more targeted in order to reach the truly poor while the emphasis must be on ‘developmental’ 
programmes that enable the poor to live a ‘normal life’. Developmental local government was to 
be a key pillar of policy.
The DA offers a paternalistic slant. The City (City of Cape Town, 2014) noted that the city is 
‘accountable for their spending of ratepayers’ money’.
We already provide generous free basic services in Cape Town. And the only reason we can do this is 
because we have a middle class who can subsidise the poor. In the three years since the DA came to power 
in Cape Town, we have doubled free basic services by taxing the rich and giving to the poor. …Of course 
we cannot continue raising rates. But fortunately most people from the middle class realise that we have 
to give services to the poor. (Stephanie Nieuwoudt, interview with the leader of the Democratic Alliance, 
18 May 2009, emphasis added) 3
Since the financial crisis of 2008, policy has taken a more conservative, revanchist attitude. The 
government’s campaign against illegal electricity connections appeals to honest residents to report 
‘thieves’ (called izinyoka, snakes, in Zulu) (Sowetan, 19 April 2012)4. Johannesburg Water’s man-
aging director complained that many Soweto residents pleaded poverty when payment for water 
was due.
When you drive around Soweto, there is a mixture of people who are indigent and those who plead 
indigence but are not. You can’t say you’re indigent and yet you run DStv and you watch pay TV. There’s 
also this culture that says water is free. (Times Live, 20 May 2015)
Pro-poor social policies thus always have normative content, and they seek to change or direct the 
behaviour of subject populations. The moral component of state social policy or welfare includes 
an image of how things ought to be, beliefs, ideologies about the state, society and the good citizen. 
These processes are mediated locally and are revealed in the ambivalent ways the ‘target popula-
tions’ view the state’s efforts (see Pithouse, 2008).
The wider issues and policy debate
Municipal officials often blame their problems on the central state’s policies of providing free 
RDP housing for the poor who cannot afford the services, then run up debts and become depend-
ents on municipalities (Interview with Finance Manager of Lesedi Municipality, 27 July 2015). 
These officials also blame the poor for feckless conduct (Pointer, 2015). Pressures have 
increased on municipalities from all sides. In 2015, the central state threatened to withhold 
equitable share payments to 70 municipalities. The South African Local Government Association 
(Salga), representing all municipalities, has suggested that metros should no longer provide 
free basic water to all.
It costs the five biggest municipalities R3.7 billion annually to provide free water, even to those who can 
pay. Ekurhuleni could realise annual savings of R1.8 billion by providing free basic water only to the 
37,000 residents registered as indigents. Cape Town might save more than R380m.
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Moreover, stopping the 6000 litres per month of free water to millions who are marginally above 
the poverty line (the missing middle) could lead to a significant increase in household municipal 
bills.
Municipal leaders are concerned about unemployment; and job losses contributed to a shrinking 
municipal tax base, resulting in lower payment levels for municipal services. Protests have 
increased dramatically and the state has continued to attempt to achieve a balance between main-
taining political legitimacy and squeezing the poor and middle class. By June 2014, municipal 
consumer debt stood at R94 billion and households were R58 billion in arrears (Sowetan, 14 March 
2015). The City of Johannesburg is owed the largest amount (R17.4 billion), followed by Ekurhuleni 
(R10.7 billion) and Tshwane (R6.6 billion).
Municipal bureaucrats claim that households typically fail to budget properly, to prioritize 
municipal payments or know their usage. However, matters are more complex. McDonald (2002) 
showed that South Africa consumers do care about their water usage and bills. Szabó also found 
that,
The issue is also not that consumers simply do not care about water. In our sample, close to 40% of 
respondents stated recently talking to neighbours or friends about water use. Instead, the primary issue 
appears to be that consumers have trouble understanding the information that is presented to them. For 
example, over 80% of consumers were unable to tell their consumption from their water bill. In general, 
households exhibited very little familiarity with the meaning of the numbers on the meter and the units in 
which their water consumption was being measured. (Szabó, 2015)
Municipal governance problems in South Africa derive in part from the larger political economy, 
which produced local government as a third sphere of government, but largely self-financed 
through selling services and collecting property rates (Atkinson, 2002; McDonald and Ruiters 
2005). Unlike provinces, municipalities are obliged to raise their own revenue and recover costs 
and they are permitted to privatise services. The Municipal Systems Act (1999) obliges cost recov-
ery; and section 104 of the Act legalizes (i) the termination or restriction of municipal services; and 
(ii) the seizure of property.
Indigency programmes have been attacked from all sides of the political spectrum: left and 
right. The policy debate about the indigent poor may be considered in at least four ways. First, the 
Centre for Development and Enterprise, together with the World Bank and the private sector, took 
a hardline neoliberal position, criticising the principle of free basic services programmes (and 
indigent relief programmes) as populism and patronage that undermines the ‘payment ethic’ (also 
see The Economist, 19 July 2003). Atkinson argued that giving free services takes away the little 
self-respect the poor have.
Ironically, many of the most faithful customers (in terms of payment for services) were residents within 
the ‘indigent bracket’ – notably, elderly pensioners, who are prepared to pay for services, due to their own 
self-respect or respect for public institutions. (Atkinson, 2002)
John Kane Berman took this further by suggesting that indigents are part of an ANC patronage 
machine.
Clients of official (ANC) patronage are public servants, and urban households who often pay nothing for 
water and electricity. Yet others are more than nine million children in no-fee schools. They may not vote, 
but their parents do. Recipients of social grants – nearly 17 million of them – are beneficiaries of the state. 
(Berman, 2016)
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Dawson (2014) made a related point that ‘corruption and favouritism’ are the prominent com-
plaints in local protest and that ‘patronage and collective action work together’. Furthermore, 
Dawson suggested that,
…the close relationship between the ANC and the state at the local level gives rise to particular patron–
client relations between low-income residents, the ANC, and the state. As a result, the state is not 
understood as a bureaucratic dispenser of public goods on the basis of rights but as a relational system of 
reciprocal dependence and obligation. (Dawson, 2014: 518)
Indigent lists, by extension, might form part of these local patronage systems. As Kenny Tsotsetsi, 
a community leader, stated it, ‘indigency is used by local government as political patronage’ 
(Interview with Kenny Tsotsetsi, 27 July 2015).
Second, differing in approach from the above authors and adopting a social rights perspective, 
Devereux argued that,
South Africa’s social protection system is exceptional not only because of the extensive coverage, relative 
generosity and efficient delivery, but because these grants are underpinned by political commitment and 
legislated rights. Uniquely in Africa, the social protection agenda has been government-led, driven by 
domestic civil society rather than external donors, and enforced by a justiciable ‘social contract’ established 
in the constitution. (Devereux, 2011)
A third view suggests that ‘pro-poor’ policies also make sound economic sense. They would 
paradoxically ‘enhance sustainability’ because the ‘adoption of the free basic water policy has not 
negated this (user-pays) principle’. On the contrary, the government argued that free basic water 
policy ‘strengthens the payment principle in that it clearly requires additional consumption to be 
paid for while allowing for free basic access by the poor necessary to sustain life – a constitutional 
right’. The state could chase the ‘non-poor’ households; state bureaucrats also termed such house-
holds ‘the won’t pays’ (Muller 2001a). Here, a commercial rather than patronage logic is at play. 
As Atkinson noted,
…payments levels have always been low, at least partly because of high levels of poverty … policy, related 
to subsidizing indigent people to afford monthly basic services, should address this issue to a large extent. 
A proper credit control depends on the primary work of determining who the indigents are, so that credit 
control efforts can be targeted at non-indigents who are in arrears. (Atkinson, 2002: 39)
A fourth view – a left-wing argument (see Bond, 2014) is that South Africa’s social policies are 
tokenistic and not adequate to support a decent life. Its
…overwhelmingly tokenistic features – including a neoliberal (fiscally-austere) context, the extension 
(not transformation) of apartheid’s inheritance, and commercialisation of state services – mean the deeper 
crises of society and economy are not being addressed effectively by the state. (Bond, 2014: 48, emphasis 
added)
Hallowes (2013: 41) similarly shows that FBE ‘was used to lure people into signing forms 
acknowledging debt to the Council. Even so, few people qualified, because ‘to be indigent, you 
have to sit on the floor’. Interviewees remarked that, ‘If you have a kettle or a TV or a stove or even 
a chair, you are not indigent’ (Hallowes, 2013). Therefore, if someone is disconnected ‘…we have 
the snakes organise for us’. This use of ‘snakes’ is a subversion of an Eskom advertisement which 
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tries to brand people who do illegal connections as anti-social’. The indigent list approach has 
been roundly criticized by progressive analysts. ‘Targeting’ requires effort to identify non-genuine 
recipients in ways that deeply affect welfare as perceived by the public (Walker, 1993: 146–147). 
Nevertheless, ‘even a sophisticated state would be hard pressed to devise and administer a means 
test which can finely discriminate income and asset levels in households’ (Lund, 2009: 280). The 
deserving and undeserving distinction is paralleled in South Africa by the ‘can and can’t pays’. 
Means tests are open to corruption, and programmes are beset by problems of low uptake. Wilson 
and Pereira similarly noted that indigency remains a zone of uncertainty for residents rather than 
outright patronage.
In many poor areas in Cape Town, households receive very high municipal bills which they are unable to 
pay. This is due to a number of issues, including leaks, inherited debt from previous owners, and many 
outside people using a household’s water. Most residents don’t know about their water rights and the 
indigent policy of the City of Cape Town. Some are aware that they receive a free basic amount of water 
but do not understand the complicated rebate system and what it implies for them. Residents are afraid to 
go and negotiate with the City to arrange for settling their debt, because several residents have found that 
when they go forward, they are then told that they must pay immediately, or receive disconnection of 
supply letters. (Wilson and Pereira, 2012)
As Titmuss (Abel-Smith, 1987: 131) observed, social programmes can often be a palliative for the 
diswelfares of capitalism whose fundamental role is to ‘induce a sense of inferiority among those 
using a public service’. Indigent programmes might do little to alter the structural situation of the 
poor – making any simple claim that they are pro-poor doubtful – but they do affect the state’s 
reach over the poor. On the other hand, concessions – even if limited – do make a difference in 
survival and building resistance movements (Latakgomo, 2011) and there is a need to investigate 
them further for their oscillations, ambiguities and political effects. There is, of course the problem, 
identified by Fraser (2012), that the leftist critique of neoliberalism and top-down bureaucratic 
welfare can be assimilated into a right-wing anti-statist viewpoint.
Concluding remarks
I have explored the convoluted micro-administrative politics of assisting and governing the poor 
in municipalities in South Africa. Municipal social packages for the registered poor offer real 
concessions and are not mere tokenism. However, municipal assistance programmes have created 
an intricate local surveillance and credit control system in which the poor’s access to municipal 
services is regulated by the local state. The moving boundary between helping and controlling the 
poor in South Africa has created new black subjects of local administration. Policy makers invari-
ably have underlying ideas about recipients’ needs and predispositions. What also emerges from 
this study is a basic ‘tension’ in social welfare between the state’s caring role and bureaucratic 
social control. Efforts to help the poor may be entangled, if not compromised, by efforts to control 
claimants, their attitudes and behaviour. The state also imposes concepts of needs and ‘resources’, 
creating struggles with communities about what these are and whose standards of needs and justice 
are being used (Harvey, 1996: 147). A stress on defining the ‘needy’ and weeding out unworthy 
or fraudulent recipients affects deeply how welfare is experienced by recipients and perceived by 
the public at large (Walker, 1993: 146–147).
The intensity, violence and visibility of black protest and the ‘extreme and unreasonable 
demands’ of the poor speak to new confidence among the black masses but this has become a 
nightmare for the local state, capital and fearful urban elites.5 The poor have taken matters into 
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their own hands through popular illegalities such as land ‘invasions’, ‘stealing’ electricity, infra-
structure, damaging municipal property, ‘stealing’ water and in some cases meting out collective 
punishment through people’s justice. As the list of those categorized as poor grows longer and 
social crisis deepens, indigency and free services will become an even larger area of class conflict 
between the local state and the poor.
Despite numerous policy pronouncements about being pro-poor and committed to social 
cohesion, the victims of apartheid in black townships and yesterday’s anti-apartheid heroes have 
become today’s anti-public villains, subject to harsh policing while service delivery is increas-
ingly designed to control recipients’ behaviours, criminalise and ‘exit’ them rather than empower 
citizens (Ruiters 2011; Naidoo, 2006, 2010). In perhaps the most unequal country, with powerful 
economic elites still mainly white, all manner of positive reinforcements are accorded to ‘loyal 
ratepayers’, investors who get ‘red carpet’ treatment. Top ANC leaders and municipal bureaucrats 
have embraced the conservative anti-welfare stance while recognising the plight of the poor 
(see various policy statements on municipal indigent policies by Zuma and municipal leaders). 
The poor form a vast electoral support base for the ANC – a fact that surely cannot be ignored. 
The ANC appears as both ally and enemy of the poor. The poor, meanwhile, are active using 
weapons of the weak, tacitly approved transgressions and popular illegalities, to shift the moving 
boundary of control and concessions.
There are lessons for all municipalities seeking a more sustainable and democratic path to citi-
zenship as opposed to an ongoing low-level war with poor citizens. There is scope to broaden and 
deepen notions of citizenship to incorporate issues such as the right to place, rights to the city, to 
land, indigenous values and practices, livelihoods, and access to resources such as water; and 
issues beyond national states, to include global regulation. Change needs to be about both the con-
tent and forms urban citizenship and governance. Democratically derived notions of ecologically 
sensitive, social needs for decommodified municipal services need to be linked with new forms of 
community.
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Notes
1. Face-to-face interviews were conducted by the author in two municipalities in different provinces 
(Gauteng and the Free State province). Key informants were senior municipal officials and local social 
movement leaders. The sites were chosen because of major protests that had occurred with regard to 




5. See Ruiters (2014) for an account of the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa’s breakaway 
from the African National Congress and the Marikana strikes, and see Neocosmos (2016).
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